Outside the media glare
The news from the India-Pakistan dialogue front is encouraging. The two countries have decided to revive their talks which have been stalled since July when bomb blasts in Mumbai led to horrific loss of life. New Delhi called off the next round of talks as a mark of protest against Islamabad because the Indians believed that Pakistan was involved in this act of terrorism. It is good that India has now agreed to revive the talks even though the Mumbai mystery has yet to be resolved as far as Pakistan is concerned. As the two sides prepare for the opening of the peace talks – the date will be announced shortly – the Indian prime minister has made a timely comment on the format of the dialogue. His offer to talk about Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan, but not publicly, makes good sense. History has shown that where two adversaries have negotiated on sensitive matters, it has proved to be unwise to do so in the glare of the media. In fact, the more sensitive the issue and the greater the give-and-take involved, discretion demands that no public discussion is encouraged until the talks are over and an agreement has been reached.
If one recalls the Oslo process that brought the Palestinians and the Israelis to the negotiating table, one would find its most notable aspect was the secrecy that was observed in the Norwegian capital where leaders from the two sides met to get the epoch-making talks started. There are other examples of how countries not even on speaking terms managed to open talks and reach an agreement by negotiating on the quiet. The Paris talks between the United States and North Vietnam that began in 1968 and the China-US meetings in Warsaw from their beginnings in 1970 resulted, respectively, in an accord on Vietnam and the Nixon Administration’s move to extend recognition to the People’s Republic of China. Both were not held as a public debate. The problem with the talks on Kashmir is that they have tended to be too open. Delicate issues have been talked about in public without any regard to the sensitivities involved. For instance, for the Indian government to even concede that there is a dispute on Kashmir carries political risks. Similarly, Pakistan feels it cannot agree to any settlement based even remotely on the status quo and renunciation of its moral support for the Kashmiri freedom fighters. But negotiations are not possible without the two sides moving away from the rigid positions they have stuck to for long. This is possible only behind the scenes. Once they go public on any issue, they find themselves playing to the gallery which only complicates matters.
Hence President Musharraf’s strategy of spelling out the framework of an agreement to the press – be it that of regional autonomy or demilitarisation – and demanding that India accept it, throws New Delhi on the defensive. Similarly, Indian allegations of Pakistan being a party to the terrorism in Kashmir evokes a strong reaction from this side. If the two sides decide to talk in private, they may be able to make progress towards a positive outcome on Kashmir, including the realisation by the Kashmiris of their political and human rights. Promoting closer contacts between the people of the two sides of Kashmir will help by creating a cordial atmosphere. Similarly, an understanding between them to impose a moratorium on trading polemical charges would certainly facilitate the dialogue.
Source: Dawn
Date:10/16/2006
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