Conflict reporting
S.M. Hali
The gory account of the Lal Masjid-Jamia Hafsa complex has been covered, discussed and analysed so thoroughly by my media colleagues that it leaves little to be added. However, one aspect that needs to be highlighted in the context of the recent episode is that of “conflict reporting”.
The revolution in information technology, from the transistor through widespread digitisation, deeply networked communications as well as the revolutionary changes in the employment of firepower have profoundly influenced analysts and planners and has completely changed the conduct of battles and their reporting.
Conflict reporting has undergone tremendous changes along with the advancement in expertise. The Gulf War of 1991 afforded the world its first glimpse of the future of warfare. Millions around the globe were treated to real-time images of precision-guided bombs annihilating targets in downtown Baghdad, learned of satellite uplinks from the battlefield that provided real-time connectivity, and applauded the ability of Stealth aircraft to ensure aerial dominance. Everyone seemed to understand that something was different about this “Video-game war”. There was much more to the spectacle than the one provided by previous wars.
When the government/military and media meet during a conflict, clashes are inevitable. The media wants to tell the story, and the military wants to win the war and keep casualties to a minimum. The media wants freedom, no censorship, total access and the capability to get their stories out to their audiences quickly. The military on the other hand wants control while the media fears that the military might stifle news coverage for enhancing their public image or cover up their mistakes.
A new dimension has been added to conflict reporting: “the war against terror”. The Lal Masjid-Jamia Hafsa episode is a classic example where the “enemy” was local home grown clerics and the students of their male and female seminaries, highly indoctrinated, equipped with a cache of weapons and perhaps aided by hardcore militants. Whether the clerics were holding innocent women and children hostage or they chose to stay back in the complex serving as human shields is now anyone’s guess since few survived the final onslaught.
The role of the media becomes critical, because allegiance, emotions and even loyalties were divided. This is where the media was tested and found wanting, perhaps because of the lack of experience. In its bid to outdo each other and report “breaking news” first, the media was initially over exuberant, took unnecessary risks, resulting in the death and injury of a number of journalists. This provided the government the excuse to physically banish the media to a safe distance. It led to speculations, suspicions and conspiracy theories. The media is still wondering about the actual body count of casualties, since most of the fatalities were transported and buried quietly.
The media had to depend on scraps of information provided by the government/military spokesmen in press briefings. They did not complain. On the other hand, media-savvy Abdul Rashid Ghazi used the situation to his advantage, talking directly to the media incessantly rather than the negotiators. This swayed the media’s and its audience’s opinion. Media even took up the dubious and unethical role of mediators in some cases and abandoned its impartiality and became a party to the conflict.
A conspiracy theory being propagated was regarding the timing of the government’s action against the Lal Masjid clerics i.e. to divert attention from the opposition’s APC in London and the plight of the flood affected in Balochistan and Sindh. Here the media itself is to blame. The government had definitely not imposed any restrictions on reporting on the APC or the flood victims. It was the media that ignored the less sensational APC and flood victims and carried out continuous coverage of the Lal Masjid operation, at times repeating old information, leading to viewer fatigue.
The Lal Masjid tragedy vis-Ã -vis conflict reporting leads to a few lessons:
” Instead of trying to provide a bullet to bullet running commentary, pragmatism, good sense and better judgement must be exercised to avoid unnecessary bias in reporting.
” Verification of facts is essential. Just presenting both versions is not enough.
” Training and orientation sessions for the media on conflict reporting should be organised by both media and the military to ensure familiarisation with the arms and weaponry in use as well as the ethics and essentials of conflict reporting.
” The basic variables of conflict reporting like the scope, appropriate terminology, spotlighting and source/authority related issues need emphasising.
Source: The Nation
Date:7/18/2007
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